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Human actions are often guided both by individual rationality and by social norms. In this
paper we explore how market competition values the variants of a product, when these variants
embody at different levels the requirements derived from some social norm. In a model where
preferences of consumers depend partially on the levels of compliance of the variants with the
social norm, we characterize the equilibrium path along which firms choose sequentially their
level of compliance and their price.
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1 Introduction
If a consumer buys a product which lacks any environment-friendly characteristics, he might
have a bad conscience because environmental awareness is expected from him. His environ-
mental attitude is influenced by friends, parents, partners, or by the media, but it is often not
strong enough to push the market share of [environment-]incompatible products towards zero
and that of the environmental-friendly substitute towards one. (Conrad 2005, p. 2)
Consider a consumer willing to buy some variant of a product. She has the choice between two
variants, one at the exclusion of the other. The first variant, while perfectly satisfying her individual-
istic and private needs, lacks some environment-friendly characteristics. The alternative variant, by
contrast, though less attractive from the consumer’s private and individualistic viewpoint, far better
meets the environmental requirements of the community in which this consumer lives. This would
be the case, for instance, if the consumer, a fan of speed, has to buy a car and hesitates between
very fast polluting car and one known for its green characteristics. Assuming that environmental
awareness is very important in her community, this consumer might choose to buy green car, even
if she privately prefers the fast car: doing otherwise would entail social disapproval so considerable
that it would enforce a reversal of her private preferences between the two variants.
As an alternative example, consider a beverage containing fruit juice and some proportion of
alcohol. According to the period and the national community under study, this proportion can vary
between 0 and 100%. For instance, during Prohibition it had to be equal to 0, while in Western
countries today there are no no explicit constraints. Nevertheless, for road safety reasons, most
regions have adopted rules limiting the quantity of alcohol allowed in drivers’ blood, with huge fines
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to be paid when the edict is openly violated. These rules not only enhance the rise of an anti-alcohol
social norm in the society, but also give rise to an objective punishment, should drivers not comply
with the rule. A driver who likes alcohol might privately prefer to drink a variant of this beverage
containing a higher proportion of alcohol than fruit juice. However, the fear of punishment might
induce her to reverse her private preference, and rather consume a lighter drink with more fruit juice
and less alcohol.
A final example is the attitude of tobacco consumers with respect to smoking. Thirty years ago, it
was fashionable to smoke cigarettes since most movie stars were hard smokers, or at least behaved as if
they were. Meanwhile, the disastrous effects of tobacco on health have been extensively documented
and an anti-tobacco social norm has developed, leading for instance to the prohibition of smoking
in public buildings, with the possibility of financial penalties for those breaking the rules.
All the above examples and comments reveal that, when making their shopping decisions, con-
sumers are not only interested in meeting their private needs, but also guided in their choice by the
degree to which it complies with some social norm. Furthermore, violation or weak compliance with
the norm can generate a social punishment, while stronger compliance can produce a social reward.
In the words of Elster (1989, p. 99), “for norms to be social, they must be shared by other people
and partly sustained by their approval and disapproval. They are also sustained by the feelings of
embarrassment, anxiety, guilt and shame that a person suffers at the prospect of violating them.”
The duopoly theory developed hereafter is based on the judgment that, in some cases, human
actions are typically guided both by individual rationality and social norms. Also it assumes that
the variants of some good reflect more or less adequately the social driving force lying behind the
norm. Consider a market with two different variants of a good embodying some characteristics
complying more or less with a social norm, such as a beverage containing more or less alcohol, or
a car in its green and brown variants. In this situation, the shopping decision cannot be viewed as
if the level of compliance of the variants with the norm would not play a role in the choice of the
consumer: it would deny the right of the consumer to be guided by the importance she pays to
herothers-regarding preferences in her choice of appliance. Accordingly, we propose in the following
to incorporate in the utility function of the consumer a new term depending, for each variant, on the
level of its compliance with the social norm. Furthermore, we introduce the idea of “social reward”
and “punishment” by assuming that the utility for a specific variant does not depend only on its
own level of compliance with the norm, but also on the social reward–punishment differential: the
larger this differential, the higher the difference between the reward when buying the most compliant
variant and the punishment when buying the other one variant. This assumption naturally flows
from the fact that consumers examine the relative compliance of a variant with the norm along a
compliance ladder, as this position contributes to defining their own relative position on the social
ladder: the higher the variant’s compliance with the norm, the higher the social position of its buyer
in the social community. Incorporating these new ingredients into the model of course affects the
demand functions of firms, whatever the level of compliance of their variants with the social norm.
Finally, we assume that firms are able to select this level of compliance in some domain. The decisions
about prices and variants are taken sequentially, first the level of compliance and then price, and we
examine the properties of the subgame perfect equilibrium of this sequential game.
Our findings are as follows. According to the relative importance consumers assign to the com-
pliance of the variants with the social norm, either both firms are active in the market at positive
equilibrium prices, or only the one with the highest level of compliance is active, the rival firm
being excluded from the market. The smaller the social reward–punishment differential between
the variants, the higher the chance of observing two variants at equilibrium. In contrast, when this
differential is large, only the variant with the higher level of compliance can survive at equilibrium.
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In this case, two subcases must be distinguished. In the first, the owner of this variant behaves as
a monopolist, but must set a price sufficiently low to keep the rival firm out of the market. In the
second, when the social reward–punishment differential is sufficiently large, the rival can no longer
pose a threat to the monopolist. Then, it is optimal for the monopolist to quote the pure monopoly
price. Finally, the levels of compliance are fully determined in the first stage of the game. When both
firms are active at equilibrium prices corresponding to the top level of compliance, the firm with
the higher level of compliance chooses precisely this top level while the firm with the low level of
compliance chooses a strictly smaller level of compliance than the top one. Nevertheless, the higher
the threat of punishment, the more compliant the choice of the latter.
The model explored in this paper shares several features with the traditional vertical product dif-
ferentiation model (Gabszewicz and Thisse 1979). Nevertheless, the introduction of others-regarding
preferences, via the existence of a social norm, considerably alters the predictions of the latter. The
differences and similarities between the two models and their predictions will be systematically
pointed out along the equilibrium analysis.
A striking example of goods subject to the existence of a social norm are environmental products.
It is not surprising that applying our results to environmental economics leads to interesting insights
in this specific field. Moreover, as will be shown later, our approach displays some properties directly
comparable with those emerging in models on the end-of-pipe approach.1 Thus, our paper opens
the door to a clear comparison between measures based on green consumerism and the traditional
environmental regulation.
In the next section we present the formal model. Then we proceed with the equilibrium analysis
in Section 3. We conclude with a short conclusion.
2 The model
Consider two variants of the same product, A and B, and some social norm developed in a community
whose members are identified by the interval [0, μ̄] , 0 < μ̄. We say that variant A fits the social norm
better than variant B if everybody in the community feels that consuming variant A complies better
with the norm than variant B. Thus, assume that variant A fits the social norm better than variant
B. Firm A (firm B) produces variant A (variant B) at no cost.2
Let μνA (μνB) with μ ∈ [0, μ̄] be a component of the satisfaction – we call it individual μ’s social
concern for product A (B) – obtained by consumer μ when consuming one unit of variant A (B);
νA (νB) represents for all consumers the rate at which variant A (B) fits the social norm, or its level
of compliance, so that νA > νB. All consumers agree on the levels of compliance νA and νB, but we
assume them to be ranked in the domain [0, μ̄] according to the size of their social awareness. This
introduces heterogeneity in the population since all individuals are not uniformly concerned with
the social norm: the closer to 0, the weaker the social awareness of individual μ in the community.
Furthermore, we assume that consuming variant A rather than variant B also affects the satisfac-
tion of the consumer because consuming a variant better complying with the social norm generates
1 Typically, the end-of pipe technologies allow pollution emissions to be reduced by implementing add-on measures rather
than using cleaner inputs or production process (Copeland and Taylor 1994).
2 This assumption is a little awkward because one can imagine that a more compliant variant should entail some costly
investments not obligatory when the compliance of the variant is a less important variable. However, if these investments’
costs are convex in quality and fixed in quantity, they would not alter the following analysis, while reducing at equilibrium
the optimal level of compliance of the variant vA. This assumption is introduced for simplicity.
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a socially worthy identity, transformed in turn into a social reward.3 Conversely, consuming a variant
less complying with the social norm generates a feeling of social disapproval transformed in turn into
a social punishment.4 An immediate byproduct of the above is that the benefit from consuming vari-
ant A rather than variant B is higher, the larger the difference between νA and νB. In the following,
we call this difference the reward–punishment differential. Thus, we add to the utility μνA another
term measuring the social benefit (reward) of consuming one unit of variant A rather than variant
B, namely α(νA − νB). Symmetrically, we add to the utility μvB the term α(νB − νA) to capture the
frustration (punishment) incurred by the consumer when she consumes one unit of variant B rather
than A. Finally, the utility for consumer μ when choosing variant A is given by
VA(μ) =
{
μνA + α(νA − νB) if she chooses variant A,
0 otherwise,
and when choosing variant B by
VB(μ) =
{
μνB + α(νB − νA) if she chooses variant B,
0 otherwise.
It is assumed that
0 < α < μ̄,
with α ∈]0, 1].
When there exist markets in which the two variants can be exchanged against money, at unit
prices pi, i = A, B, the utility after purchasing variant A (B) is given by a quasi-linear utility function
UA(μ) = VA(μ) − pA (UB(μ) = VB(μ) − pB).
Finally we assume that the level of compliance is chosen by the firms in some domain [ν, ν]: there
exists a lowest level of compliance ν such that, if the proposed variant did not meet this level, the
social norm would be violated. In contrast, there exists a highest level of compliance ν guaranteeing
that the social norm is fully satisfied.
3 Equilibrium analysis
We consider a two-stage game. In the first stage, firms have to decide the extent to which their variant
complies with the social norm, namely, νi, i = A, B. In the second stage of the game, each firm
chooses its price pi, i = A, B.
The game is solved by backward induction. Assuming that firms choose first the level of com-
pliance νi, i = A, B, in the domain [ν, ν], and then their price, we determine first the demand for
each firm as a function of pi and νi, for i = A, B. Then we determine the price equilibrium for given
levels of compliance, and, finally, we identify the optimal level of compliance.
Traditionally, when deciding whether to purchase a good, a consumer takes into account the
benefit deriving from the intrinsic characteristics of the good and the price at which it is sold. As we
have just seen, the existence of a social norm introduces further ingredients into her decision-making
process. In particular, when an individual takes into consideration the consequences deriving from
a specific purchase in terms of social reward and punishment, a variant which would not be a priori
3 This social reward can sometimes assume the shape of a subsidy, as in the example of the solar panels above.
4 This social punishment may sometimes assume the shape of a tax or a fine, like in the example of the car drivers above.
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considered in the shopping list can be bought for its social value. In order to embed these ingredients
in our formal analysis, we define both the marginal consumer μ̂(pA, pB) indifferent between buying
variant B and variant A at prices pA and pB (solution of the equation VA(μ) − pA = VB(μ) − pB),
namely,:
μ̂(pA, pB) = pA − pB
νA − νB − 2α,
and the consumer μi(pi) who is indifferent between buying product i and not buying at all (solution
of the equation Ui(μi, pi) = 0). Accordingly, we write
μB(pB) = pB + α (νA − νB)
νB
(> 0)
and, in the same way,
μA(pA) = pA − α (νA − νB)
νA
> 0 if pA > α (νA − νB) .
From the above definitions, we provide in Appendix I the demand functions faced by firm B and
firm A, respectively, namely,
DB =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
μ − μB(pB) iff μB(pB) < μ < μ̂(pA, pB)
μ̂(pA, pB) − μB(pB) iff μB(pB) ≤ μ̂(pA, pB) ≤ μ
0 iff μ̂(pA, pB) < μA(pA, pB) < μ
and
DA =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
μ − μA(pA, pB) iff μ̂(pA, pB) < μA(pA, pB) < μ
μ − μ̂(pA, pB) iff μB(pA, pB) ≤ μ̂(pA, pB) ≤ μ
0 iff μB(pA, pB) < μ̄ < μ̂(pA, pB).
Notice that, in the case μB(pA, pB) < μ < μ̂(pA, pB), the demand function for firm B turns
out to be μ − μB(pA, pB) > 0, while that for firm A is zero. Thus, it is immediately concluded that
in this range of μ-parameters, firm B monopolizes the market, while firm A is inactive. By the same
token, firm A monopolizes the market whenever μ̂(pA, pB) < μA(pA, pB) < μ, firm B being
inactive in this range of μ-parameters. Finally, in the case where μB(pA, pB) ≤ μ̂(pA, pB) ≤ μ,
firm A and firm B share the market.
We can now start solving the game. To this end, we move to the analysis of the second stage where
price competition between firms takes place, assuming that the level of compliance has been chosen
by each firm at the first stage.
3.1 The second stage game: choosing the price
Let i be the profit function of firm i, i = A, B, defined by
i(νi, pi, νj, pj) = piDi(pi, pj).
In order to identify the equilibrium prices, we first define the best reply functions5 of firm A and
firm B. Notice that in order to solve this stage of the game, the level of compliance is assumed to be
exogenous so that we can solve for the equilibrium prices with respect to νA and νB.
5 Details on these functions are provided in Appendix II.
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We find that the prices observed at equilibrium crucially depend on the ratio νA/νB. Depending
on whether the value of this ratio is smaller or larger than H1, with H1 = μ̄/2α, the corresponding
equilibrium prices lead to two different market structures.6 In the first, observed when νA/νB ≤ H1,
both firms are active in the market and equilibrium prices p∗A and p
∗
B are positive and given by
p∗A = 2μ̄νA
νA − νB
4νA − νB (3ανA − ανB) ,
p∗B = (νA − νB)
μ̄νB − 2ανA
4νA − νB .
Notice that the condition νA/νB ≤ H1 cannot be met without the inequality H1 > 1 being met,
implying μ̄ > 2α from the very definition of H1. The larger the value of μ̄, the more significant
the heterogeneity among consumers and the larger the domain of α-values satisfying the condition
μ̄ > 2α. Thus, the market can sustain both variants if the heterogeneity among consumers (μ̄)
is sufficiently large and/or the role of punishment and reward in consumers’ decisions is not too
significant.
The equilibrium prices identified above are exactly those which would obtain in a vertical product
differentiation model if the reward–punishment differential did not play any role. Interpreting the
reward–punishment differential as a difference between a subsidy and a tax rate on the two variants,
we see that the existence of this subsidy and tax increases (decreases) the equilibrium price p∗A (p
∗
B)
compared with the equilibrium values observed in the traditional vertical differentiation model with
an uncovered market. The rationale behind this finding is that the reward–punishment differential
strengthens the traditional market power of firm A, while weakening that of its rival firm B.
In contrast to the above analysis, firm A evicts firm B from the market in the case where
νA
/
νB > H1. Indeed, variant A is so significantly compliant with the consumption norm (compared
with variant B) that no consumer is willing to buy variant B, whatever its price. In this latter case,
the equilibrium prices of firms A and B are given, respectively, by
p+A =
(νA − νB) (ανA + ανB)
νB
, p+B = 0, if
νA
νB
≤ H2,
and
p◦A =
1
2
(μ̄νA + α (νA − νB)) , p◦B = [0, y], if
νA
νB
> H2,
with H2 = 14α
(
α + μ̄ +
√
2αμ̄ + 9α2 + μ2
)
.
Observe that, when νA/νB ≤ H2, the equilibrium price p+A coincides with the so-called “limit
price” arising in a vertical product differentiation model: this price, with p+A < p
◦
A, is set sufficiently
low to keep the rival B out of the market at equilibrium.7 In this case, the equilibrium price p+A turns
out to be higher, the higher α. Indeed, a high value of α magnifies the role of social punishment,
thereby reducing ceteris paribus the benefit deriving from purchasing variant B. As a consequence,
firm A can keep its competitor out of the market at a relatively higher equilibrium price p+A , com-
pared with a scenario with a weaker punishment incurred by consumers when buying variant B.
Accordingly, in this scenario where νA/νB ≤ H2 holds, firm B, in spite of being inactive in the
6 See Appendix III for details.
7 Notice, however, that, contrary to the limit pricing strategy used by the high-quality firm in a vertically differentiated
market, the limit price strategy used here by firm A does not imply that the market is covered.
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market, still affects the equilibrium outcome. In contrast, when νA/νB > H2, the monopolist A is
a “true” monopolist to the extent that its rival can no longer affect the equilibrium. By the way,
it is easy to check that the price pA is the pure monopoly price corresponding to the situation
where firm B would simply not exist. In this case,8 one can see that the resulting market share
DA = (μ̄νA + α(νA − νB))/2νA, when assuming α = 0, coincides with that observed in the “true”
monopoly case.
We can summarize the above findings as follows.
Proposition 1 At the subgame price equilibrium, depending on the value of the ratio νA/νB, either both
firms are active in the market at positive equilibrium prices (νA/νB ≤ H1), or only the firm endowed
with the higher level of compliance is active, the rival firm being excluded (νA/νB > H1).
Further, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 1 When the market is monopolized by firm A, its optimal price is given by min
[
p+A, pA
]
.
3.2 The first stage game: choosing the level of compliance
Let us now consider the first stage of the game when the firms choose their level of compliance νi,
in the domain [ν, ν̄], i = A, B. First, we remark that the market can sustain both variants if the
heterogeneity among consumers (μ̄) is sufficiently large and/or the role of punishment and reward
in consumers’ decisions is not too significant, namely H1 ≥ 1. Otherwise, when H1 < 1, only firm
A can be active in the market, firm B being evicted.
Notice that, in both these subdomains, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 1 The profit function of firm A is monotonically increasing in νA for all νB ∈ [ν, ν̄]. Thus, its
best reply function is always given by ϕA (νB) = ν̄.
Regarding firm B, in the domain where it is active, namely H1 ≥ 1, its best reply function νB (νA)
is given by
νB (νA) = γνA, γ = 2μ̄ − 3α +
√
(2μ − α) (23α + 2μ)
7μ − 4α < 1.
Thus, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 2 When μ̄/2α < 1, firm B is inactive, and firm A selects ν̄. Otherwise, with both firms
being active in the market, the levels of compliance corresponding to the Nash equilibrium are given by
(ν̄, γν̄) .
It is worth noticing that this result is not in line with the traditional findings in vertical dif-
ferentiation. Indeed, in vertical differentiation models, the low-quality firm can be inactive under
particular conditions on the model parameters only if the market is covered, with all consumers
buying the high-quality variant. Then a finiteness property holds, according to which only a single
firm can survive at equilibrium (see Gabszewicz and Thisse 1980); when this is the case, the market
8 Notice that market share corresponding to the monopoly case when a limit price is quoted is defined as D+
A
=
(μ̄νB − α(νA − νB))/νB .
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is a natural monopoly. In contrast, when the market is uncovered, the finiteness property does not
apply.
In the current model, by contrast, there exist some circumstances under which firm B cannot
stay active in the market due to the existence of social norms, regardless of the coverage of the market
at equilibrium. In particular, it follows from the above that when μ̄/2α < 1, the firm B with the
lower level of compliance is kept out of the market. Also, this finding holds whatever the level of
market coverage as it depends only on the intensity of social norms α with respect to the consumers’
heterogeneity in the market μ̄.
Finally, evaluating the derivative ∂νB/∂α in the subdomain defined by the condition 1 ≤ H1
(see Appendix IV), we get the following proposition:
Proposition 3 At the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), the compliance level of firm B in the
range of parameters where it can be active in the market increases with α.
Accordingly, the parameter α can be viewed as an incentive for the less complying firm B to
increase its level of compliance. When α increases, the punishment for deviating from the social norm
becomes more and more influential on the consumer’s decision. At some point, when α becomes
so high that the condition μ̄ > 2α is violated (thereby implying that the inequality νA/νB ≤ H1
no longer holds), the less complying firm is driven out of the market: all consumers feel that it
sells a variant insufficiently complying with the social norm. It is easy to see that, when α = 0, the
model considered above boils down to the usual model of vertical product differentiation studied by
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979).
3.3 A natural extension
One may wonder to what extent this interdependence among preferences plays a key role in the
analysis. For example, is the SPNE robust to the idea that consuming a variant less compliant with
the social norm does not generate a feeling of social disapproval transformed in turn into a social
punishment? This question seems reasonable, mainly when thinking of communities where social
awareness is weak. Casual observations show that social attitudes are not uniform worldwide and
can increase with education, thereby being particularly strong among high-skilled and high-income
people. In these circumstances, our assumption regarding the positive role of social punishment
turns out to be questionable. In order to analyze this issue, one needs to perform the analysis under
the assumption that VB(μ) = μνB. This allows us to capture the idea that some consumers do not
care about the existence of goods complying with the social norm when evaluating benefits from
consumption. While knowing that there exist variants with different degrees of compliance, these
consumers do not feel embarrassment or guilt when buying the variant νB.
Rather interestingly, it emerges that in this circumstance, the unique price equilibrium is given
by
p̌A = (νA − νB) 2μ̄νA + 2ανA − ανB
4νA − νB ,
p̌B = νB (νA − νB) μ̄ − α
4νA − νB
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such that both firms are active in the market achieving the following profits:
̌L = νB (νA − νB) (μ̄ − α)
2 νA
(4νA − νB)2
,
̌H = (νA − νB) (2μ̄νA + 2ανA − ανB)
2
(4νA − νB)2
.
Furthermore,
∂
∂νA
̌H > 0,
and the optimal level of compliance for the less compliance variant ν̌B is given by ν̆B = 47νA. It
is worth noting that this level of compliance coincides with that which would be observed in the
traditional model of vertical differentiation with partial coverage of the market. Moreover, at this
SPNE both firms are always active in the market.
Thus, whenever social awareness occurs only among people buying the more compliant good,
the role of others-regarding preferences in defining market equilibrium turns out to be drastically
less significant compared to the alternative case where social rewards and social punishment affect
consumption.
4 An application to environmental economics
As stated in Section 1, environmental economics constitutes a natural field for applying the above
results. In this interpretation, the variant with the higher degree of compliance should be viewed
as a “green” product, the “brown” one being identified with the firm showing the lowest level
of compliance with the environmental norm. In this strand of the literature, the core question is to
identify means for reducing pollution damage at the international level. In Europe, the environmental
policy is identified by the EU Emission Trading Scheme. Launched in 2005, this scheme is mainly
based on a “cap and trade” principle: a cap defines the total amount of greenhouse gases that can be
emitted by producers. Nevertheless, this approach has been questioned, as unilateral environmental
policies can drive out firms to countries with less stringent regulation (the so-called “pollution
havens”), or incite these countries to use environmental dumping to attract foreign direct investment.
Our analysis reveals that there exist alternative ways, based on profit-driven mechanisms, to
sustain green production, with positive effects on pollution abatement. Assuming that the pollution
damage decreases with the level of compliance, our results can be interpreted as follows. First,
whatever the equilibrium market configuration, pollution abatement is driven by the existence of
others-regarding preferences, compared with the situation where consumers’ behavior would be
only shaped by individual rationality. In the case when both firms are active at equilibrium, the
compliance level selected by both firms is higher than it would be without such preferences, while
the market share of the brown variant shrinks. As for the monopoly case, the pollution abatement
follows directly from the fact that the brown variant must simply disappear from the market.
Furthermore, the above pollution abatement is a direct consequence of the market mechanism,
rather than following from an explicit environmental policy. Thanks to this, it escapes the carbon
leakage phenomenon that occurs when an explicit unilateral abatement policy is introduced, inducing
polluting firms to relocate to pollution havens with less stringent regulation (see Sanna-Randaccio
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and Sestini 2012). Indeed, the brown firm of our model is prevented from relocating to a pollution
haven while selling its variant in the home market: no consumer would be interested in buying this
variant due to its insufficient level of compliance with the social norm.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we explore how duopoly market competition values the variants of a product, when these
variants embody at different levels the requirements derived from some social norm. Introducing a
model in which preferences of consumers depend partially on the levels of compliance of the variants
with the social norm, we characterize the equilibrium path along which firms choose sequentially
their level of compliance and their price. We conclude that the dependence of preferences on the
level of compliance exerts a beneficial effect on the choice of variants by firms. In particular, when
interpreting these results in the framework of environmental concern, they reveal the existence of a
pollution abatement obtained independently from any explicit environmental policy.
While economists generally adopt a methodological position of strict individualism when de-
picting consumers’ behavior, one must recognize that consumers’ decisions are often significantly
influenced by their social environment and the set of values that it conveys. Of course this recog-
nition does not simplify the analysis of market behavior because it introduces externalities in the
preferences of individuals. Nevertheless, it seems useless to get around this difficulty: more and more
frequently, consumption decisions involve elements borrowed from the social sphere of individuals.
Think of tobacco, drugs, brown products, arms and other goods, viewed as nuisances by a majority
of the community in which consumers are immersed. The present paper is an essay to explore this
world using the traditional tools of economic analysis.
Appendix I
Demand functions
First, notice that μ̂ − μB and μ̂ − μA have the same sign as μA − μB .
Let us denote by p̄B = μ̄νB − α (νA − νB) the reservation price of variant B for the consumer μ̄ such that for any
pB > p̄B, no consumer is willing to buy variant B. Then, let us denote by pBB = pA − (μ̄ + 2α) (νA − νB), for given pA,
the value of price pB corresponding to which consumer μ̄ is indifferent between buying variant A and buying variant
B. Finally, let us denote by p̆B = νBνA pA − (νA − νB)
ανA+ανB
νA
the value of price pB such that, for any pB ≤ p̆B, μ̂ ≤ μ̄.
Symmetrically, we denote by p̄A = μ̄νA + α (νA − νB) the price pA such that no consumer is willing to buy variant A for
pA > p̄A, and p̆A = νAνB pB + (νA − νB)
ανA+ανB
νB
the value of price pA such that, for any pA ≤ p̆A, μB ≤ μ̂ ≤ μ̄. Finally,
let pB
A
= (μ̄ + 2α) (νA − νB) + pB be the value of pA corresponding to which μ̄ is indifferent between buying variant A and
variant B, given pB .
Thus, we can split each demand function into two separate functions as follows. If pA ≥ μ̄νA + α (νA − νB), then firm
B’s demand function is given by
DB =
{
μ̄ − pB+α(νA−νB)
νB
if pB ≤ p̄B,
0 if pB ≥ p̄B,
while if pA ≤ μ̄νA + α (νA − νB), then
DB =
⎧⎨
⎩
μ̄ − pB+α(νA−νB)
νB
if pB ≤ pBB,
pA−pB
νA−νB − 2α −
pB+α(νA−νB)
νB
if pBB ≤ pB ≤ p̆B,
0 if pB ≥ p̆B.
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Furthermore,
min{p̄B, pBB} =
{
p̄B if μA ≥ μ̄,
pBB if μA ≤ μ̄.
Indeed, the inequality p̄B ≤ pBB implies that pA ≥ μ̄νA + α (νA − νB) or μ̄ ≤ μA, so that DA = 0. Thus, firm B may obtain
the whole demand of the market or be inactive depending on the position of μB with respect to μ̄. In particular, DB = μ̄ − μB
if μB < μ̄, while DB = 0 if μB ≥ μ̄.
Tuning to firm A’s demand function, if pB ≥ μ̄νB − α (νA − νB) , then it is given by
DA =
{
μ̄ − pA−α(νA−νB)
νA
if pA ≤ p̄A,
0 if pA ≥ p̄A,
while if pB ≤ μ̄νB − α (νA − νB), then
DA =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
μ̄ − pA−α(νA−νB)
νA
if pA ≤ p̆A,
μ̄ −
(
pA−pB
νA−νB − 2α
)
if p̆A ≤ pA ≤ pBA,
0 if pA ≥ pBA.
Given that,
min{p̄A, p̆A} =
{
μ̄νA + α (νA − νB) if μB ≥ μ̄,
νA
νB
pB + (νA − νB) ανA+ανBνB if μB ≤ μ̄,
the inequality p̆A ≥ p̄A implies pB ≥ μ̄νB − α (νA − νB) or μ̄ ≤ pBνB +
α(νA−νB)
νB
= μB , so that DB = 0. Thus firm A obtains
the whole demand of the market or is inactive depending on the position of μA with respect to μ̄. In particular, DA = μ̄ − μA
if μA < μ̄, while DA = 0 if μA ≥ μ̄.
Summarizing the above findings allows us to write the following demand functions:
DB =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
μ̄ − pB+α(νA−νB)
νB
if pB ≤ min
{
p̄B, p
B
B
}
,
pA−pB
νA−νB − 2α −
pB+α(νA−νB)
νB
if pBB ≤ pB ≤ p̆B,
0 if pB ≥ p̆B,
and
DA =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
μ̄ − pA−α(νA−νB)
νA
if pA ≤ min{p̄A, p̆A},
μ̄ −
(
pA−pB
νA−νB − 2α
)
if p̆A ≤ pA ≤ pBA,
0 if pA ≥ pBA.
Appendix II
Best reply functions in the price game
Firm B
It follows from the demand functions that if pA ≥ p̄A, namely μ̄ − μA < 0, then
B =
{
pB
(
μ̄ − pB+α(νA−νB)
νB
)
if pB ≤ p̄B,
0 if pB ≥ p̄B.
From the first-order conditions (FOC), one can immediately write the best reply function ϕL (pA):
ϕB (pA) =
{
1
2 (μ̄νB − α (νA − νB)) if p̄B > 0,
[0, y] if p̄B ≤ 0.
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In contrast, if pA ≤ p̄A, namely μ̄ − μA > 0, then profit functions for firm B turn out to be:
B =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
pB
(
μ̄ − pB+α(νA−νB)
νB
)
if pB ≤ pBB,
pB
(
pA−pB
νA−νB − 2α −
pB+α(νA−νB)
νB
)
if pBB ≤ pB ≤ p̂B,
0 if pB ≥ p̂B.
The FOC imply:
pB =
{
1
2 (μ̄νB − α (νA − νB)) if pB ≤ pBB.
1
2νA
(pAνB − (νA − νB) (ανA + ανB)) if pBB ≤ pB ≤ p̂B.
If p̄B ≤ 0, then p̂B < p̃B < 0. Thus, firm B’s profit is equal to 0 for all pB ∈ [0, y] and
ϕB (pA) = [0, y], ∀pA.
If p̄B > 0, then:
 if p̃B ≤ pBB , then ϕB (pA) = p̃B ;
 if p̂B ≥ max{0, pBB}, then ϕB (pA) = p̂B ;
 if 0 ≤ p̂B ≤ pBB ≤ p̃B , then ϕB (pA) = pBB ;
 if p̂B ≤ 0, then the profit is equal to 0 and ϕB (pA) = [0, y].
Notice that the SOC are always satisfied.
Firm A
Applying the same rationale as above, one can derive that if pB ≥ p̄B , then
H =
{
pA
(
μ̄ − pA−α(νA−νB)
νA
)
if pA < p̄A,
0 if pA ≥ p̄A.
From the FOC, the best reply function is:
ϕA (pB) = 1
2
νA
(
μ̄ + α 1
νA
(νA − νB)
)
if p̄A > 0.
It is easy to check that the SOC are satisfied.
Otherwise, if pB ≤ p̄B, then the profit function is given by
H =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
pA
(
μ̄ − pA−α(νA−νB)
νA
)
if pA ≤ p̆A,
pA
(
μ̄ −
(
pA−pB
νA−νB − 2α
))
if p̆A ≤ pA ≤ pBA,
0 if pA ≥ pBA.
The FOC imply that:
p̃A =
{
1
2 νA
(
μ̄ + α 1
νA
(νA − νB)
)
if pA ≤ p̆A,(
μ̄ + 2α + pB
νA−νB
)(
1
2 (νA − νB)
)
if p̆A ≤ pA ≤ pBA.
A simple computation suffices to that the SOC are satisfied. So,
 if p̃A < p̆A, or pB >
(μ̄νAνB−(νA−νB)(2ανA+ανB))
2νA
, then ϕA (pB) = p̃A;
 if p̆A ≤ p̂A ≤ pBA, or pB < (μ̄νB−2ανA−ανB+ανB)(νA−νB)(2νA−νB) , then ϕA (pB) = p̂A;
 if p̂A < p̆A, or
(μ̄νB − 2ανA − ανB + ανB) (νA − νB)
(2νA − νB) ≤ pB ≤
(μ̄νAνB − (νA − νB) (2ανA + ανB))
2νA
,
then ϕA (pB) = p̆A.
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Figure 1 The intersection of best reply functions.
Appendix III
Market structure at equilibrium
Three cases have to be distinguished for the best reply function of firm A at the second stage according to the sign of the
thresholds of its definition domain, namely the sign of (μ̄νAνB−(νA−νB)(2ανA+ανB))2νA and
(μ̄νB−2ανA−ανB+ανB)(νA−νB)
(2νA−νB) .
To this end, notice that
(μ̄νB − 2ανA − ανB + ανB) (νA − νB)
(2νA − νB) > 0 ⇔
νA
νB
< H1,
with H1 = μ̄/ 2α, while
(μ̄νAνB − (νA − νB) (2ανA + ανB))
2νA
> 0 ⇔ νA
νB
< H2,
with H2 = 14α
(
α + μ̄ +
√
2αμ̄ + 9α2 + μ̄2
)
. This implies that there are four cases of intersection between the best reply
functions of both firms:
Case 1 νA
νB
< H1;
Case 2 H1 ≤ νAνB < H2;
Case 3 H2 ≤ νAνB ≤
(μ̄+α)
α
;
Case 4 νA
νB
>
(μ̄+α)
α
.
These four cases are depicted in Figure 1. Notice from the figure that cases 3 and 4 can be combined because they lead to the
same set of price equilibria. In case 1, firms A and B share the market, thereby both being active at some positive equilibrium
prices; in the two remaining cases only firm A can be active in the market at some positive equilibrium price.
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Appendix IV
Proof of Proposition 4
First, notice that the difference between the equilibrium νA − νB is given by
1
7μ̄ − 4α
(
5μ̄ − α −
√
44αμ̄ − 23α2 + 4μ̄2
)
ν̄.
In order to prove the statement in the Proposition 4, it suffices to show that ∂
∂α (νA − νB) < 0. Indeed, given that νA = ν̄,
the difference νA(= ν̄) − νB can decrease if and only if νB increases. The derivative of the above expression with respect to α,
namely ∂
∂α (νA − νB) , boils down to
73α − 170μ̄ + 13
√
44αμ̄ − 23α2 + 4μ̄2
(7μ̄ − 4α)2
(√
44αμ̄ − 23α2 + 4μ̄2
) (μ̄ − α) .
While both terms in the denominator are positive, the term in the numerator is negative. So we can conclude that this derivative
is negative, meaning that the higher the value of α, the lower the value of νA − νB , or in other words (given νA = ν̄), the
higher the value of α, the higher the value of νB .
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